more reasonable than direct regulation in some situations, they also are risky; in any event, for a variety of social ills, indirect regulation is not an adequate substitute. Finally, the authors examine how planners might conceive the task of regulatory design, and assess institutional procedures to curb regulatory excess. They speculate that regulatory unreasonableness may breed an unfortunate reaction—a move to make everyone accountable for everything. That tendency, they argue, could sap the citizenry of a sense of responsibility as they seek to avoid being judged for wrong-doing.

Bardach and Kagan have written a book that all students of regulation and public administration generally will want to read. The work identifies an important problem and analyzes it in a most insightful way. Covering a wide range of material, the book is rich in detail, drawing not only on some fresh research, but also on existing literature. This fine book should stimulate further studies that test its assumptions. More data should better enable political scientists and policymakers to differentiate among various kinds of site-level regulation, to make some judgments about the prevalence of "unreasonableness," to determine under what circumstances movement can be made toward the ideal of the "model inspector," and under what situations something that is perceived by some as regulatory unreasonableness is in fact the inevitable and perhaps necessary cost of pursuing certain social objectives. For encouraging such thinking, political scientists all owe a considerable debt to Bardach and Kagan.

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One can sometimes tell a book by its citations. Breyer, superlative lawyer that he is, documents his text with more than a thousand notes. Most cite lawyers and law cases. Most of the ideas cited come from economists. A perusal yielded no references to a political science journal, although Theodore Lowi's End of Liberalism does get its usual mention. However, "Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci." and "J. Law & Econ" appear repeatedly. Several well-known economists and lawyers make the index—such as Alfred Kahn, Paul MacAvoy, Ronald Coase, George Eads, G. Calebresi, Richard Stewart—but nary a political scientist, sociologist, psychologist, organizational theorist, or historian.

Breyer is forthright about the nature of his book. He points out that "the approach of this book is normative. It considers "justifications for regulation, not causes" (p. 9). He adds "the book does not provide a general causal theory or explanation of regulation. Instead, it asks what reasonable human goals a program might sensibly have, regardless of its historical origins. It assumes that regulators seek in good faith to attain such goals, regardless of the existence of other possible motives in fact" (p. 10). All students of political science realize how severely these limitations confine this book.

As Breyer acknowledges, he owes a "considerable intellectual debt" (p. viii) to Alfred Kahn, Paul MacAvoy, and to the array of economists they represent. The analytical sub-
stance of the book is largely based on economics. The presentation is clear, but deriva-
tive. The seven supply and demand diagrams and the one equation are all relegated to
the end notes. Various economic models are adumbrated and their conclusions ex-
plained, but the models are not questioned and the conclusions are not derived.

Most of the economic thinking associated with Kahn and MacAvoy has focused on
the regulation of prices and market entry by such federal agencies as the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Com-
misson, the Federal Power Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. In this
general area, some strong arguments can be made for deregulation, and some major
steps toward deregulation have been taken over the last few years. Breyer cogently
explains these arguments and reforms.

Most of the recent growth in regulation has been in different areas (health, safety, and
environmental regulation) by such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Breyer tries to handle this kind
of regulation by lumping it together with price-and-entry regulation as "economic regula-
tion." This is too procrustean a bed; Breyer barely touches on the perplexities of regulat-
ing uncertain risks to life and limb. The book is essentially about the regulation of prices
and markets. Nearly all the ideas in it concern this kind of regulation, as do most of the
pages and examples.

The book is well written, but since it breaks little new ground it may be boring to those
familiar with the relevant literature. The jacket blurb claims that "because it is compre-
prehensive and superbly organized, with a wealth of highly detailed examples,"—which is
correct—"it is practical for use in law schools and in courses on economics and political
science." Students of economics would have to supplement it with some more rigorous
economics. Students of political science should read it only to discover something about
economics and law. There is little political science in it.

In short, this is a textbook of sorts, written by a lawyer and inspired by some econo-
mists, that focuses on the regulation of industries like the airline, trucking, and natural
gas industries. In its narrow category, it is excellent. Nothing better like it exists.

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Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement by
$12.95.

Michael Pertschuk has written a lively autobiographical memoir of his years as a con-
sumer activist, first on the staff of the Senate Commerce Committee and then as chair-
man of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). However, the book, based on a series of